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Assisted suicide where the ‘assistor’ is a beneficiary under the deceased’s will and/or 
attorney under a power of attorney granted by the deceased: What are the potential 
consequences? 
By Barbara Hamilton and Tina Cockburn1 
 
The recent criminal conviction2 of Queensland teacher Merin Nielsen for aiding the suicide 
of an elderly acquaintance, Frank Ward, raises some timely issues, particularly for succession 
lawyers. This is the second time in recent years that there has been a conviction of a person 
who participated in a scheme for euthanasia, in circumstances where the convicted person 
was a substantial beneficiary under the will of the deceased person. In the other recent case, 
Shirley Justins was initially convicted of manslaughter for assisting her former de facto 
partner, former pilot Graeme Wiley, to commit suicide,3 although the conviction was 
eventually overturned.4 Justins then plead guilty to assisting suicide and the Crown accepted 
the plea.5 Both cases involved the importation and administration of the euthanasia drug 
Nembutal/ Pentobarbital.  
Voluntary euthanasia is legal in some overseas jurisdictions such as Switzerland, Holland, 
Belgium and Luxemburg. In 1997 legislation to legalise euthanasia in limited circumstances 
was enacted in the Northern Territory,6 although this was repealed after only nine months 
operation. It would seem that there is support in certain sections of the Australian community 
for legalised euthanasia under controlled conditions. For example, it has been reported that 
former Brisbane Lord Mayor Clem Jones left a bequest of $5 million in his will to fund a 
campaign for the legalisation of euthanasia in memory of his late wife who he cared for while 
she suffered from cancer in the years preceding her death.7 Such support for legalised 
euthanasia suggests that similar cases may arise again. 
Nielsen  
In the Nielsen case, Merin Nielsen was convicted of aiding the suicide of Frank Ward. The 
deceased was a widower aged 76, who had emigrated to Australia to marry. He had no 
relatives of his own, though his wife had relatives in Canberra. He had nursed his wife as sole 
carer over a twenty year period while she had multiple sclerosis, and had expressed a firm 
desire to himself avoid a prolonged illness or incapacity. Although the evidence was that Mr 
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Ward was an isolated man in his old age, in her sentencing remarks, Justice Dalton 
concluded:   
“I don’t accept that he was lonely or vulnerable because of his isolation. Witnesses 
described him as stubborn and cantankerous. He certainly knew his own mind, and 
there is no question that he had full capacity at all relevant times.”8 
Mr Nielsen met Mr Ward in about 1980/1981 when he joined a meditation group attended by 
Mr Ward. After Mr Ward suffered a minor stroke on 11 July 2007, the relationship between 
Mr Ward and Mr Nielsen increased. Justice Dalton found:  
“He asked you for help and you gave it. He trusted you. He made you his Power of 
Attorney on 25 July 2007, and he made you the sole beneficiary of a will dated the 5th 
of August 2007... At the same time, July 2007, as Mr Ward had his stroke, made you 
his Power of Attorney and made you his beneficiary, you contacted Exit International, 
a pro-euthanasia group on Frank Ward’s behalf.”9 
During the period following Mr Ward’s stroke, Mr Nielsen assisted him with shopping and 
banking, thus gaining some “idea of his financial state”, although it did not appear that he had 
“any precise idea of his net worth.”10 Following Mr Ward’s recovery from the stroke, contact 
became less frequent. However, Mr Nielsen remained in contact every one or two months, 
and told police that he felt somewhat obliged to continue being friendly to Mr Ward because 
he was a beneficiary under his will.11 
In June 2009 following a request from Mr Ward, Mr Nielsen travelled to Mexico to purchase 
the drug Pentobarbital, which he gave to Mr Ward on 20 June. Mr Ward was found dead later 
that day with a bottle of Pentobarbital next to him, some of its contents in a glass.12 
Following the death of Mr Ward, Mr Nielsen was charged, found guilty of aiding the suicide 
and sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment, with a parole release date following six 
months in custody.13 
Justins 
In the Justins case, former Qantas pilot, Graeme Wiley, who had been diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease and had twice previously attempted to commit suicide, made a will 
drawn by his solicitor a week before his death. Under this will he left his $2.4 million estate 
to his de facto partner, Shirley Justins, and only relatively small legacies to his two daughters. 
Under his previous will Wiley’s estate was divided between Justins and his two daughters 
(the daughters being entitled to share one half of his estate). The daughters commenced 
proceedings to challenge the will for lack of capacity. According to a press report, the lawyer 
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testified that she believed that her client had capacity and was not subject to undue 
influence.14 She also testified that she had no knowledge that he had Alzheimer’s disease, or 
that he had previously attempted to commit suicide.15 Indeed, it has been reported that in the 
criminal trial the jury was informed that Justins had not told the solicitor that Wylie was 
suffering dementia when she asked her to draw up the new will.16 In relation to this turn of 
events, in Nielsen Justice Dalton commented: 
“I find quite disturbing in that case a factor that, very shortly before the assisted 
suicide, the defendant had a solicitor, who didn't know her husband, and who wasn't 
told of his medical condition, prepare a new will under which she benefitted very 
substantially in relation to a very big estate, an estate worth about $2 million.”17 
Potential consequences of assisted suicide: Application of forfeiture rule, breach of 
fiduciary duty and/or undue influence? 
In cases such as the Nielsen and Justins cases, where the person aiding a suicide is a principal 
beneficiary under the will of the deceased, various legal consequences may follow which may 
result in loss of such benefit.   
(a) Forfeiture rule 
The public policy underlying the forfeiture rule is that where a person unlawfully kills  
another  person, the killer should not benefit from the killing by inheriting all or part ofthe 
deceased’s estate. 18 The rule has been applied even where the killer has been acquitted of 
murder or manslaughter, as proof of unlawful killing such as to invoke the rule can be on the 
civil standard.19 The common law rule has been applied both flexibly20 and rigidly21 in 
modern case law. A flexible interpretation has frequently been sought when the context is a 
‘battered woman’ has killed her spouse/partner in circumstances which suggest self-defence. 
Very often the woman pleads guilty to manslaughter to avoid risking a conviction for murder. 
A rigid interpretation of the rule by the majority of the NSWSC in Troja v Troja.22 In that 
case the rule was applied to a battered woman who killed her husband in circumstances 
which arguably amounted to self-defence. Kirby J in dissent viewed the killing as in 
circumstances that were ‘morally blameless’. The Troja case led to the enactment in NSW of 
the Forfeiture Act,23 which gives the court an explicit discretion not to apply the rule as the 
justice of the case demands. A Forfeiture Act was introduced in 1991 in the ACT.24 Both the 
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ACT and NSW legislation was modelled on the UK Forfeiture Act 1982. No other Australian 
jurisdictions have followed suit, although in 2004 the Tasmania Law Reform Institute  
recommended legislation along the lines of the NSW model.25 When the NSW Attorney- 
General introduced the NSW forfeiture legislation he specifically referred to certain kinds of 
cases, which might invite the court not to apply a forfeiture eg when the person who kills is a 
‘battered woman’ or the killing is part of a suicide pact.26 The New Zealand Law 
Commission’s recommendation for codified forfeiture legislation (eliminating judicial 
discretion as in NSW and the ACT) also contended that a killing as part of a suicide pact or 
assisted suicide should not attract forfeiture.27  So it would seem there is some support for a 
flexible approach to the application of the forfeiture rule. 
(b) Breach of  fiduciary duty 
Even if the scope of the forfeiture rule is not considered to include circumstances in which a 
person convicted of assisted suicide (as distinct from manslaughter), in cases such as Nielsen, 
where the person aiding the suicide had been appointed to be the attorney of the deceased, 
this relationship may form the basis for equitable relief such that any benefit obtained under 
the will of the deceased  might be disgorged as a remedy for breach of equitable obligation. 
The relationship between principal and attorney under power is an established category of 
fiduciary relationship28 and this is reinforced by the Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 73, 
which imposes a duty on an attorney for a financial matter not to enter into a conflict of 
interest transaction without the consent of the principal. That the fiduciary relationship 
between principal and attorney arises upon execution of the power of attorney and is not 
conditional upon exercise of power under the power of attorney was made clear in Smith v 
Glegg.29 It is a general principle of equity that a fiduciary will be held liable to account 
(generally by way of equitable compensation) if it is established he or she has obtained a 
profit, personal benefit  or gain in circumstances where there existed a conflict of personal 
interest and fiduciary duty, or a significant possibility of such conflict.30 In Nielsen, Ward had 
appointed Nielsen to be his attorney and primary beneficiary under his will. That Nielsen had 
a financial interest in Ward’s death is indisputable, although this was not put as a primary 
motive for assisting Ward to commit suicide.31 
There is no precedent for setting aside a willed gift for breach of fiduciary duty at the suit of 
the person who would take in the event of the gift not being upheld. However equitable 
principle suggests that where there a fiduciary obtains a personal benefit by reason of breach 
of fiduciary duty,  equitable compensation may be payable to the residuary beneficiaries of 
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the estate of the deceased or those who would take on intestacy, provided there is an adequate 
and causal connection between the unlawful gain and breach of duty.32  
(c) Undue Influence 
A will (where the principal beneficiary is the attorney and has aided the suicide of the 
willmaker as in Nielsen) may naturally be challenged on the ground of undue influence, 
which is often argued in conjunction with lack of testamentary capacity. As the probate 
doctrine of undue influence requires proof of coercion,33 this is difficult to establish and 
would be particularly so on the Nielsen facts, given Dalton J’s findings that: 
“I don’t accept that he was lonely or vulnerable because of his isolation. Witnesses 
described him as stubborn and cantankerous. He certainly knew his own mind, and 
there is no question that he had full capacity at all relevant times.”34 
It may also be possible to raise a presumption of undue influence which arises where there is 
a transaction between a principal and an attorney under an enduring power of attorney (S87 
Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld)). The presumption has been applied even when the 
transaction is not effected by exercise of the power of attorney and comes into effect when an 
enduring power of attorney has been signed.35 Whether a ‘transaction’ within the meaning of 
the section 87 would include a willed gift is debatable but possible. If so, a presumption of 
undue influence would arise, which would cast the onus on the attorney (Nielsen) to show the 
willed gift was the product of Ward’s full, free and informed thought.  
Conclusion 
The recent criminal law decisions where people have been convicted of aiding suicide raise 
important legal and ethical issues in relation to whether euthanasia should be legalised. These 
cases also raise issues of great significance for succession lawyers.  
There are some unanswered questions: Will the common law forfeiture rule be applied to a 
person convicted of aiding suicide as distinct from manslaughter? What are the consequences 
of forfeiture?  If there is a forfeiture, is the wrongdoer obliged to hold his or her forfeited 
interest on a constructive trust or to be treated as having predeceased the testator? Should 
there be legislative reform to give a judicial discretion to modify the effect of the forfeiture 
rule where the Court is satisfied justice requires the rule to be modified? Should such reform 
follow the judicial discretion model adopted in the NSW and ACT forfeiture legislation? 
Would a better model for reform be the NZ  proposed codified forfeiture legislation? 
In cases where the person aiding the suicide had been appointed to be the attorney of the 
deceased, this relationship may form the basis for equitable relief (equitable compensation 
and/or constructive trust) for breach of fiduciary duty on the grounds of conflict of interest 
and duty. Furthermore, particularly in Queensland, the statutory presumption of  undue 
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influence resulting from s87 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) may ensure the onus shifts to 
the beneficiary of the gift to show the gift was the product of the willmaker’s full, free and 
informed thought. 
Given that there remains ongoing community debate as to whether assisted suicide should be 
legalised, there is little doubt that the issues concerning the legal consequences where a 
person convicted of assisting suicide is a beneficiary under the will of the deceased will 
continue to arise.  
 
 
 
